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Chapter 3 
COUNTERFEITING TRUTH: STATISTICAL REPORTING ON THE 
BASIS OF TRUST 
David M. /,e,y 
George Mason University 
Sandra J. Peart 
Baldw/11-Wallace College 
1 I NTRODUCTION 
Semantics and game theory offer modem approaches to very old problems.1 David Lewis 
introduced game theoretic concepts into the study of language in bis examination of conventions. 2 
In this chapter we study the language of a specific sort of conventions: sratistical c.~timators. 
Such estimators have the important propeny of being both well-defin::d mathematical objects and 
devices that fonn the basis of factual claims asserted and, perhaps, believed by rational agents.' 
The convention we analyze allows econometric reporting to proceed on the basis of Lrust. 4 In 
1Cnmnp (1942. pp. v- vi): .. Senmnrical concepts, c.,pccinlly the concep1 ofrruth, have been discussed by philoso-
pher<; since nncien1 time;.. But a zystemmic development with 1he help of die exacc i11Wumcn1s of modem logic has 
been undertaken only in recent years .... On die basi" of 1hcsc preliminary analyses. Alii'cd Turski (who is now in 
this counll')') laid the foundation of a systematical construcrion.0 Tarski's work is ccntr.ll to thnt of Carnap ( 1942, p. 
vi) nnd Quine ( 1940. p. 4). among others. Luschci (1962) is a full-length attempt 01al use~ mnnuscriptand memoTy 
10 recover the contributions of Stanislaw tcsmewskl 
2Barw1o;c & "1oss (1996. p. 4): -rhc plnlosopbcr David Uwis uncovered a deep source of drcularily in buman 
affairs, described in bis famous siudy of con"conon (Lewis, 1969). All social institutions. from language 10 laws 10 
customs about which side of the sidewalk to u.<;c, arc b.'\SCd on conventions shared by the commum1y in question. 
Bui what does ii mean for a socieiy to share a 1.-on\'cntioo? Certainly, pan of what it IJlCMlS is thal those who accepc 
some convention, say. C, behave in a given away. Bui Lewis also argues tha1 another imponam pan of what makes 
C 11 convention is 1hat those who accept C also accept that C is a shared convention." 
31.cwis (1969, p. 204): "One kind of senmnlics anulyres truth. analyticity, and lhc rest in relation 10 possible 
inrcrpl'clcd languages, in abstraction from any users thereof. This is the kind or semantics done by Prege, Tarski, 
n.nd (m~t of the time) Carnap .... The other .kind of semantics analyzes tnith, analyticity. and 1hc rest. in relation 
to an ngcnt or a population of agents. Tbis is the kind of semantics done by die late1· Wiugcnstcin, Grice, Skinner, 
Quine, Morris, Liff, and (S-Ometunes) <.:amap." 
40ewnld et al. (1986) first publicly demonstrmcd how hard it was, even for j;iumal editors, to ob1ain the data 
used 10 obmin publishtd estimates. Without the dllta it is difficult to reproduce the published results. Are publishing 
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contrast with Lewis, we shall demonstrate that such a convention is conducive to conflict rather 
than co-ordination. 
Long before game theory and semantics. inde.:d. long before economics i t~elf. exchange con-
ducted hy means or mon.:y was linked to language. In the Republic (37 lc) Socrates talks about 
"money as a token for the purpose or exchm1ge:· Economists have long argu.:d that, for money 
ro function as a mechanism of exchange. there must hc some assurance--ca1Tied by institutions 
and language---{}f its quality. Our argument is simple. Supposing money and language are inter-
related the way that philosophers and economists often claim th.:y are interrelated, if we do not 
take money solely on the basis of trust, why do we lllke claims regarding truth on the basis of 
trust? 
TI1erc are two pa1ts of our chapter. First, we review Adam Smith's argumcm that the evo-
lution of monetary institution~ i~ tied up in che p roblem of detecting deceitful 1ne1<1l uffeto::d in 
exchange. Smith points to no s uch compamhlc institution by which deceitful policy advocacy 
is detected and severely punished.~ Yel hi~ rc:commcndation for caution in Lhe ernluation of 
policy advocacy poinL~ Lo the caution chat rourincly prevailed in monetary matters before public 
safeguards evolved t\i make the metallic content of the medium of exchimge lransparclll ru1d LO 
preserve its quality. Second. we Lum Lo a diff.:rent sort of deceit. in the reporting of statistical 
evidence. We apply Smith's insights regarding counterfeit money to the case of incentives for 
deceit in reporting statistical rcsulL~. In the production of "truth". there is no evolved institution 
that compares to the Mint. We summarize our rcccm work regarding how another instirution-
competing expert witnesses might deal with deceitful s tatistical argumcms. 
We juxtapose these two broad topics. money and truth telling. to emphasize tbe common 
SlruClure they share_ !hat of an insti tutional rram.:work rhar relies (rightly or wrongly) on trust 
carried by language. lt is importanL to emphasi1e. in addition. that these arc pan of our larger 
enterprise. l:iconomists model ordinary people a~ seeking the private good of happiness. Yet we 
persist in thinking of ourselves, qua economists. as seeking the public good of truth. And we 
have failed lO confront the inconsistency in such a modeling prOCt!dure (Peart & Levy, 2005). 
2 ADAM SMITH ON DECEIT 
As economists have only recently re-acquainto::d t.hemselves wid1 language as an object of 
study (Rubinstein. 2000). a paK~age from Smith ·s Lectures on Jurisprudence that links money 
and language might not come readily to mind: 
The offering of a shilling, whkh to us i1rp.:a·s tn have so plain and a simple a meaning, is 
in reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so and so fL~ il is for his interest. Men 
always endeavour 10 p~rsuude others 10 he of their opinion even when che matter is of no 
consequence Lu them ... ( 1978. 352) 
ff offering money is a form of persuasion wrapped up in the scmamie notions of meaning and 
truth , then what is the semantic counterpart of counterfeiting money? 
incentives conducive to trulh seckintt? This is the subjccl of the issue of Social £pi.11enwlogy f1>r which Foigcnbaum 
& I .evy (199 3) served as the jum1iine, off point. 
5 In an age in whjcb torture \lr'ac; rouLi1u.~ ~•ati: policy, the penalfies infljrted upon the auacks on lhc rn<>ncrary bi1sis 
of the stale were noticeable for their savagery. An allack on the sovereign's monetary authority was viewed in much 
the same light as ao atmck on the physical body or the sovm:ign (Kelly, 1981). Tbe juxtaposition of fu>ctions of the 
l!nil~-d States Secret Service-protecting the l'residtnl and comb>1ting couote.rfeit currency-is a surviving in;lancc 
of such an idcorificarion. 
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In Chapter -l of Rook I of the llea/ih of \ ation' ';mtlh gi'<!> a social C\Oluuonary accounl of 
the t.X·onomic inM1tu11on ol money.• He explains how metallic oommo<litics came to be used as 
money. This. however. cr.:ated a ~ct of prohlcms. rir,t. then: i, tht matter of \\.'etght: 
The use of 1 111.:tal~ 111 th1> rude si.1te w~ Jllcnded " ll h 1wo very considerahlc 111coll\C01enc1e.<: 
firs t wilh 1lw 1roublc uf weighing: and, secondly. w11h that of assaying them. Jn the preciou< 
metals. where: a small difference in the quu111i1y makes a great difference in U1e 'alue. C\'Cn 
the husinc." of we1gh1 ng. with proper exxtne». requ ires a1 lc11s1 very accurate "'c1g h1s ruid 
,calcs. The wcigh111g of gold 111 panicular is an 01>cn11ion of some nit:cty. I n Ille coarser 
mcrnls. indt'ed. where a ' mall error wou ld hi! of liu lc consequence. k s> accuracy wo uld. no 
doob1. b<: lll'<:C>'al). Yet we should find II "ceSSl\cl) trouble<ome. if every umc: a poor man 
had occa<ion cmher Ill buy or sell a fanl11ng '< wonh of good-'. he was nhligoo to weigh the 
fanhing. (I. 1v '171 
Then 1hcre is pn1blcrn of J~..aying: 
The o r cra1i11n of a1>M1ying is st ill more 1.ltfficul1. still more tedious. and. unless ;1 ran of 
lite melal i> fairly 1ucltcd in the cnicible. '"lh proper dis<olvcms. an) i:onclusion thai can 
be drawn from it. i' e~1remely uncenain llcforc th<' 1n<1im11un of coined mo11c:y. however. 
unlc~> they went through !his Lcclious and 1lif'fict11L operation. r coplc must :il wltys have been 
liabk to the i;msscsl l"rauds anti imposition<, and it1'lcad of a fXlt111d weigh! uf pure sil ver. 
o r pure copp.!r. might receive 1n c'Changc tor their goods. an adullera1cd ~cm1 posi1ion of 
lhe t:oat'SC\t ,and cheapest lll3tenab. which hnd. however. in I heir outward apf)Canuu;c. been 
m;idc to n:'cmhlc !hose metals. <I. iv 't7J 
For each probh:m. ;1 ~1 of '<)lutioos "offered 
To preve111 " .1d1abuse,, 10 facihl atc exchange~. and I hereby to encourage all ,ons of industry 
;mt.I co1tuncrcc. tt has ti.:cn found nccc:,sary. 1n all coumnes tha1 hJve maJc Jrl) con'1dcrable 
Jdv.mce> ""' ,m.Js tmprovemem. 10 affix a puhlic stru11r upon ccnain qu.u11 1 11c~ of such par-
ucul ar mernb. us were in those coun11ic:; commonly rnadc use of 10 purchase ,goods. lience 
the origin of coined muney. ru11J of thooc r 11hl ic offices called 111ims: inMi lutions cx;ictly of 
the >ame na1urc: " 'ith 1ho-;e of Lhc aulnagcr' anJ stampmastcrs of " oollen amJ linen cloth. All 
of 1hem an: equal!) meant 10 a;ccriain. by mc:in' of a public stamp. the quan1i1y anJ unifom1 
goodness of 1hose diffcrcm cnmmo<lilies when hrought 10 mar~c1 (I. iv , 7) 
Smith Lhcn argue, 1hai hiMol) can be i:xplamed a,, folio" ing an t.:'olutionary pathv.ay: 
The h~l puhltck stamp' of lhi• k111J that were affixed 10 the current mc1al,. ~ccm in many 
ca'e' LO have hccn imenJcd to ascertain . whJl 11 was both mos1 difficult .111d most 1111ponant 
to a'ccnain. the goodness o r fincnc;< of 1hc metal. and 10 have rcscmbl~ the >terhng mark 
wh1l'it is at prcM:ni affixed 10 plalc and bars of silver, or the Spanish mark which is ~01rn:1imes 
aflhc<l to ingn1s of gold. :u1d which hc ing '1nick only upon one s iJe of the piece. and not 
ctwcring the " hole surf.ice. ascerlJtn' !lie fine ness, hu1 not the weight of the 1neial. (I. iv ~8) 
The 111con"emcncy and diflicul1y of weighing those 111e1<1ls with cxaclnes' gave occa.<ion to 
lhc 111Mi tu1ion of coins. of which lite stamp. covering c:mircly t>cnh side' of the piece and 
~urncum~ the edges too. "'as <uppoi.cd to l-..c<'n:ll n not onl) lhc hncne.,. hut tbc weight of 
the metal. Sueh coins, Lhereforc. v.ere received by tale as 31 pre,rnt. without the trouble of 
wc1t•h111g. (I. iv 1 9) 
•F.A. Il a)<~'< defcn<c ofe,·ohed 10stitu11"n'· v.h1ch tle'-elop' 1ckas m lJa, 1d ll umc. surgc<ts thni .JI C''Ohe<I 
tonveauo11' or~ equally useful. This claim. nnd the res1><msc 10 it. arc smd1ed in Peart & I evy (21XJ6). Lew1•s 
con.$tructio11 shnres 1-1:·1yck's Hu1ncn11 roots ( 1961). p. J). b1.11 ir does 1H1f mnk.e such :i clai1n. 
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The passages we omitted above, and those which follow. suggesl wlhy it took Smid1 iwenry 
years to complete the Wealth of Natio11s. Ile has surely forgotten more about the history of 
coinage than these two readers will ever know. When Smith describes the state policy of debasing 
coinage as a type of fraud, perhaps his readers rt:called the proverbial question-who guards the 
guardians'' 
The problem of deceit is critical to what might be considered as Smith ·s public choice view 
of state policy. Needless to say. a policy of state-sponsored monopolies is the systematic target 
of the Wealth of Nations. Smith ex.plains this policy is founded upon preventing deceit. This 
argument appears in the c.:onclusion of Book I in which the interc.~ts or I.he different classes of 
society are c.:ontrasted. 'vVe stmt with the workers' employers: 
His employers constitute the third order, that of 1hose who liv<: by profit. II is the stock that is 
employed for the sake of profit. wbich pu1s i1no mmion Lhe greater pa1t of the useful labour 
of every society. The plans and projecls of lite employers of stotk regulate and di1·cct all the 
most important operations of labour, and prolil is the end propo~ed by all those plans and 
projects. flut the rauc of profil doeb not. like rem and wages, rise with the prospcri1y. and fall 
with the declension of 1he sociely. On the contrary. it is nan1rally low in rich. and high in 
poor countries, and ii is alway~ highest in the countries which arc going fastes1 to min. The 
imcrcsl of this thin! order. therefore. has noi the same conncc1ion with 1he general interest of 
the society as that of the other two. (1. xi "1264) 
Smith appeals to a learning by doing explanation for differential compet·ence: 
Merchants and master manufacturers are. in this order. the two classes of people who com-
monly employ the largest capitals. and who by 1hcir wcallh draw 10 themselves the greate~t 
share of the public consideraiion. As during their whole lives they are engaged in plans and 
projects, they have frequently more acuteness of understanding than the :greater pan of coun-
try gentlemen. As tllcir thoughts. however. are commonly exercised rather about the interest 
of their own particular branch of business. than about that of the society, their judgment. even 
when given with the greatest candour (which it has not been upon every occasion) is much 
more to be depended upon with regard to the former of those two objects, than with regard 
lo the latter. Their superiority over the roumry gentleman is. not so much in their knowledge 
of the puhlic interest, as in their having a belier knowledge of their own interest than he has 
of his. (I. xi , 264) 
This competence has cash value: 
ll is by this superior l<nowlcdgc of their own in1erest that they have frequently imposed upon 
his generosity, and persuade<.! him 10 give up both his own interest and that of the public. 
from a very simple but honest conviclion, that their interest. and not his. was the interest 
of the public. The imerest of the dealers, however, in any particola1· branch of 1rade or 
manufaclurns, is always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, lhat of the 
public. To widen the market and to 11a1Tow the compc1i1ion, is always the interest of the 
dealers. To widen the market may frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the 
public; hut to narrow the compclition must always be agriinst it, and can serve only to enable 
the dealers, by raisitig 1bci.r profi1s above what they natural ly would be, to levy, for !heir own 
bcoelll, an ab~urd tux. upon the rest of their fellow-citizens. (!. x.i ~264} 
All or this molivate$ Smith's udvice to his readers. Lacking an institution that serves as the 
rhetorical equivalent of rhe public mint. each citizen must weigh and assay arguments made by 
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puhl) maker-. 1us1 a~ the qualil) of mc1ah olfcrcd in exchange had Ileen 1111lgcd in harharous 
llllll'' 
rhc Pf{'l'O'.tl of an~ n~ la" ,,.. n·gul31tl'lfl ,,, (OrllJll<n-c: "h:icii c~ from th" v'ller. <JUght 
.t1"3~> 11• he 1stened "'"uh gl'l'al pra:autu'n .u1d OO!!hl ~<'rto h<' Jdop4c:d ttll after havmg 
ho.-en long .ind carefully <'xammL-.l. not only w11h the most scrupulou.<. l>ut wuh the most 
\u;picmu' 011co11on lt come< from an ortkr of men. "hose intcrc>t 1< nc'a c:"1c1I) th<' 
'aim.; w1lh lhJI of 1hc public." ho hJ1e gc1wr,1ll) an interest 10 doccl\c and''"'" to opprc~ 
1hc public. and who m.:wrdingl y huve. upon many occu.,ions. bo1h d1..-ccivcd and opprc,M.:d 
i1. (1. xi ,i'2M) 
Inc que;tton 10 '' hich "e llO\\ tum i\ "hc1hcr competi tion anwng dc<:c1\'cr~ i.< ,ufficicn1 10 
sol' I.' <;nutJJ ·, problem of ~ece11 in the arena of 'm1is1icul reporting. 
3 WHAT D OES T HE Eco~O~IIST WA~T? 
To model a dccei1ful philosoph<:r. we need tn ..ay what he want'" We rcprc:scnt th" is.sue 
in term' of our pre' 1ou~ \\Ori.. on cthtl:\ and c,umatton (Lev) & Pe;tn. 2006). In Figure I. \\C 
prc,cnt competing prderencc-. over c.~timatc' where we model the 1rade·off hc1ween h1a> and 
'tatistical t:ffic1cncy. We dcpart from 1hc tcxthool.. treatmcnt of the goals of .~wtistical rcsc:m'Cl1 
and :1llow 'bia' in one din .. -ction to he: a desired property of am estimate. A rc-cnrcher may pn.:f.:r 
to rcprc,ent the \\Orld one wa) rather than anolhcr The constraiat we 11naginc lollows Lhc 'implc 
mcchm111:!> of 'Jll:nficauon ''-'arch or d•lla m111111i;. where 1me make' many c'umntc.~ and pick.<> a 
fa,oritc (Leamer 198'.\. Denton 198:'i). In p;1111cular. these constrainb. the rcph1.:auoo '>CL n:>uh 
from .:umputing ;1 numhcr of unh1:i,cJ c ... 11m.1te' and mapping out the lmnuer combma11on of 
bia' and cfficio.:ncy (l·eigenhaum & 1.c' y. 199(1). 
We 1.:unsider 1wo sons of preference~ one 1111 11 puhlk-spiritcd stati.<>tic ian and one fur ~ome­
one with both public and private ''<lllh. fhc pubhc-<;pirited stati>tict:in " 1ntere,ted only 111 \Ill· 
lhtlcal clhdcnc). J number" ithouL a <.1gn E:.ilher the sta11~1idan doc' nm care :ihout the value of 
the parJmeter to he estimated or. pcrhap<; he d<>e' 1.:arc. but he is unwilhng to g ive up any amount 
of \tatt\ttcal efficiency to get a more plca.,ing c-.11malt!. In F'igUTe I. th" poss1h1ht) is de'l:nbcd 
by md1lh:rencc cune JJ. JCor such o ,1attsttc1an the rational estimate 1' J' When po<itf\c b1a.~ 
1~ a good. ho" e\ er. indifference cun c' tal..e the <.hape marked by U. Thu> the r.111onal est1m;1tc:. 
nnc:: in which sonic ~tatistical efficiency is 1radcd away for some gain i11bias.1.-. i ' . 
The A mcri1.:an legal system seem\ an id.:al c:hc 10 consider such rational cl11111.:e estimjt1on 
in 111.:01111x.:1itivc contc~t becau.,e the;: 111011v111wn fur non·tran,.,parencic~ "all-too ohvious. In this 
ron1c~1. the problem is that contending client.~ hi1e cxpcr1 economc1rida11s 10 press their ca~c 
before a JUI)'. 
Strudural equallon esomaaon is a natural tc't ground for chill.in~ nbout h<m the Lh1.:on~ts · 
moti'a1111n' are aftcctcd because Lhe 1dcnt1f}mg rc.,Lri•tions How from thoorcucal insight. It 
" perh:ill' not a comcidencc that strul·turnl equJtton estimation is at,11 fenilc ground to ,1uJ} 
deceitful c'>ltm.tllon because current ~011,cnaon, do llO{ require the rc..c.irchcr to document the 
con...equcncc-. of d1tlcrent selcctmns ol m'trumental \arlablc,. 
1Th1~ 1111crprcm1i1111 11f Smith migh1save111111 lrom 1hc wrath of (;e<>ri:e Stigler lur hn•in@ f.11lcd to apply the 
full-inforu111<i,111 sclr interested modd in poh1irnl d1~u~,;,,,, <Sugler. 19/ I) 
•Th1\ "'"""" 1s n lar~dy a sununn')' of 111': work rcponcd in Le•y & Penn (2006) in which we em11l1'Y 1he 
munvt'Ul(Hlnl ..:l:.1m of a ')' mpalhetu.: '"'flstic1an \\'ho is influenced by the w:inlS o( ll .;I ii:1H. 
44 Game Theory and Linguistic Meaning 
Relative Efficiency 
)' 
0 
Bias 
- -4----
Figure I : Competing ralional estimates 
II 
This is the convention which we explore. The regression strategy need not be revealed. We 
need repo11 only die equation system selected from the search. 
Consider a demand and supply syslem ( D & S) of the following structure:9 
Quantity - 131 + 132 Price + /33 Income + 11 (D ) 
P.rice = <X1 + a 2 Quantjty + oc.i Cost + oc1 Weather + oc5 Politics + e: ( S j 
We suppose that the statistidan has preferences over the estimated value of 132- A researcher 
is required by convention to report only D . mentioning S casually. Thus, one can choose whether 
to include one, two or three exogenous vm'iables from S. The rational choice estimate is the result 
of computing all possible combinations which identify a system and then picking. As above, we 
suppose the client and the sympathetic cxpe11 wants both bias and statistical efficiency. We 
measure the efficiency of estimator i. by the minimum mean sqLiare error IMSE*] of the estimates 
considered relative to the MSE of estimator i.; thus, MSE* /MSE;. 
A simulation is provided to give some idea of the ease with which biased estimates can be 
generated by such a selection procedure. There arc several techn.ical details. First. what is the 
distribution of the exogenous variables'! If they are omitted not only do they change the en-or 
distrihution but also the degree of over-identification, which changes dramatically the properly 
of 2SLS estimates (Phillips. 1983). In the ca~e considered. all exogenous variables are assumed 
to be a standard normal. Thus. omi tting an exogenous variable in search of a pleasing outcome 
will not change the normality of the rc..~ulting errors. 
9-rhe alph .. urcall I; fl 1 is 10: !32 is ·I: fl3 is 3. 
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We consider two types of scan:h. First, there is an unconstrained search for lhe maximum 
(minimum) value of the est imates 01 132. In the Tables below this i.~ caUed "Max" anti '"Min." 
SC\:ond. there is a search which is constr.iincd I)) the d~ire co have at lelbt iwo exogenous 
variables in tbc supply curve. These are called ··c-Max'" and "'C-Min.'" This will ~uggc.~t how 
mui:h die researcher might be willing to give up in efficiency to get bias. 100,000 e)(periments 
for N=25, 100, 400, 1600 arc !)l!rformctl in Shazam 8.0 (White, 1997). 
All of the simultaneous estimate~ arc replicable "two-st.age lea>! squares'" estimate~ or "'inef-
ficient two-stage least squares" although only 2SLS and OLS are non-deceitful. The divergence 
between the "rational choice" estim11h: und the transpare nt 2SLS estimate can be thought of as 
transparency hias. Such bias pcrsbts through the c.:ase of N= l600. 'u 
Table I: Nom1al Exogeuous Variables 
I 00.000 R~plication~ 
N::25 N=lOO ~=400 N=l600 
Bias ffficiency 81:1.• EOic1cncy Blas l:.fficieocy lltas hffic1cncy 
01.S 0.40 0.J5 0.40 0.08 0.40 0.02 0.40 0.02 
2SLS 0.03 1.00 0.0 I LOO 0.00 1.00 0.00 l.00 
-C-~in .{l.21 0.27 -0.09 OA8 -0.04 O .. 'i4 -0.02 o.~ 
C-Max 0. I 7 0.58 0.08 0.66 0.04 0.63 0.02 0.6'.l 
Min -1.74 0.00 -0.22 0.14 -0.09 0.21 -O.C)4 0.21 
Max 1.87 0.00 0 16 OJ2 0.08 0.30 0.04 0.30 
Whi le the bias declines in abwlme value as N increases. the reduction in bins from incre~1s-
1ng N by a fnctor of four can be held in Ch«k by moving from the C-Max (C-Min) to Max 
(Min). This suggeSts that the problem of convergence will depend upon how the po~1hle models 
increase as N increases. The simulation con,idered only exogenous variables which were truly 
indudcd in the structure. We leave the problem of identifying the system by employing random 
numhers for future research. The problem of "p-,eudo-identificatioo"" rai~es chcorctjcaJ question.• 
that emerged at the dawn o f simultaneous equation estimation and seem to have re-appeared in a 
new guise. 11 
The literarnre on the economic~ of expert witnesses has supposed that the jury decision will 
be made on the busis of an average of such biased estimates. This average is w hat the jury 
believes to be rme. The condusion of Froeh & Kobayashi ( 1996) for the case of biased e)(pcns 
he fore a jury, is that the average of their estimmc.s wi ll be unbiascd. 1i And, it will be obvious 
"Judging from I 0.000 experiments the b1iu pe"'i."' through '1=6400. If the bia.' were 111C:Lwrcd in terms of the 
Jll<.•th:tn Of lhc cstiout~s insteOO of the mean. II too would persist. The experiments "CfC rq>ealed With all exogcnou.• 
\llri:tbles following a uniform distributi0<1 hctwee11 0 and I. Since 11 1s not surprising th:tt lhc umount of 1hc bias is 
ocu1cly seol.\ili'c to~ dismb<Jtion oflht omined exo11cnous variables. the.-<e results arc not reported. 
We have hcncfined fmm a cocwc~1uo11 with Anllur (;oldbe~ about the concem.\ of 1hc Cowles Commi.-ioo 
on fXCudo-idenhficarion of siroctural cquauon Cl>!imnte• ond with Adolf Uusc on lhc modem di'«:u.-;sion of wcnk-
tdtnuficution 
''In this. chcy arc followed by Po&ncr who oontcnds lh>t mis propcny of a oompetith'C procedure males 1hc 
idea of a co1111-n1111ointed expcn witue.s unwal'rnntcd: "Ille use of n court-appointed expcr1 is problematic when 
\for example. Ill the d.1mages phase of lhc case) lhc ~)(per1 witness'~ bonom line is a number. For then. in lhc 
"~'"" of oppming witrte•scs, the trier of foci c:in 'split 1hc difference: after wei)!btin~ c:icli witrtc" 's cstin1au: by its 
pluu.,ibilicy"( l'osner. 1999, p. 1539). 
-16 Game Tht'Ol.1 and Lini:ul\lll' ,\k.inmg 
from the whlcs all11\c that. roughl) spe;:1l.1n1!. the polic) de1crmmcd h)' the a\cmgc of l\hn .ind 
Ma' 1>r b) the averat?C of C-~lm and C-.\l:u "111 be unh1a,ed. 
llt1'4c...,1:r. chis pohc} ''ill ha\c a h1ghcn.m.iru: than .i policy determined b) both using 2!'.L5. 
mu~. "..: i:r.:ate the familiar pn,oner's d1lcmmn m staliMical con1c~1. While 11 •~ m the 1111c1cM 
of c.1d1 >1u1isticia11 considered ,,cparatcly h> c 11g:tj!C in , .:kctive undct 1.:porting ol rc~ults. 11" 111 
the interc'l o f tht: ~tall~ticians considered •" .i group not tO under rcpun. Thi\ '' 'ho" n b~ tilt! 
re-uh 1h.11 the diagonal clcmcnr " mughl) unh1J\Ctl but the cell "here both stau .. uc.1ans cnr.igc 
in "h1a' ~cd.ing" hch11v1or ha.-. Im' er stariM1cul efficiency than when they rcs1ram 1hcm~ch c.,. 
A' an 1llustra1ion of the poinl. a simulmioo of a quancr million n.:plicatillfl\ wa.-. conduclcd 
10 generate the sta11~11ci.in ·s d1h:mma u"ng 1hc .:a-.: of normal exogcnuu., 'anahlc' "1th N ... ioo. 
Hi:rc h1.1' '' compulcd 1n term~ of de' i:11wn 1111111 1hc 2SLS estimarc '" ~" 10 rcpn:,cn1 1hc 1r<111' 
parenry htas. The efhc1ency 1s now 1hc mean '4uarc cm>r relative 10 lht• minimum where h1t1' j, 
mca~urc<l in term~ of deviation from the mc.111 2'iLS est imate. 
-
nms 
2SLS 0.00 
C-Ma\ 0.02 
Illa~ 0.().1 
-
Tah~ 2: F..conomttrician's l>ilemm• 
Noml:ll l:.A1~~1Ullh Vana.hl"'°, N:;.l(JO 
250.Cltltl l{cphcat1on• 
2!11.S C.:·Mon 
l· lhc1cncy Ilia' f\ffidcncy Bia~ 
1.00 () 02 U.XI -0.05 
0 .88 II()() t oq1 -0.0~ 
0(>-l 1111~ 092 -0.01 
t.. 1111 
1,11k1cnry 
ll .50 
0.7~ 
() 1\6 
The 11pt1m1~Licconclu~ion ofrrncb & Kul>a};bhi ( 19961. followed h~ Posner< 1999). dcpcnJ, 
upon their c'tclusive f<ll:U' on the prohlcm ot h1.1, . But 11 ':uiancc "Jl'41 an "'uc. h«.lu\C uni: 
v.om.:' ahout the eflic1cnc) of the proces:... thcn 1hc1r opt1mi~mabou1 the unres1m:1cd compcllll\C 
process ol C).pcrt witnc'' ~rn< more complicarcd than lh.:y suggc't A rule "h1ch coo\tr.1111' 
cxpcrt' In 1cpon onl} 2SLS rc,ul l' "ould hJ\C a "na.llt.'1' 'anance 1h.1111hc compcllll\1: pn.xc" 
mo<leloo Jbt" e. 
4 C ON CLUSION 
l:scn under the 1dealitcd cond111ons dc,t·nhi:d ahcnc. compcti111111 gcncrarc' rhc ob' 11111' 
pmhlcm nl a prisoners ' dilemma. This rc.,ull' from a convenrion wl11d1. contrary to thow 
modeled in Lewis (I 9691. forms the h:isis of t·11nflti:1 rather than co-onh11:111on The r.:~ult 'ul:! 
l:!C'l' th.it 11 'h1•uld he JlO'-"bk 111 pnlJ>O* a parclo 'upcnur comen111111 \\.: llffcr one such. J 
c11mputa111111a.ll) -mten<i\I:: \Cr51on of final-o iler arbttrauon. m le\)' & Pean (20CXl) 
l-01 1hc IJ1gcr proJCCI n1 hand. g.unc LhCor') 11nd scmnn ucs, we hn\C prcllCnh.:d n lony model 
of an enormous problem. I low doc.\ 1he ordinary person deal wi1h ad' 10.:c. earned 111 langu.igi: 
and rcp11rung comcnllon,, from 1111111,atcd C\pcn, ·1 Wan.' and all. •11mpc1111on prm id.:-' t>nc: 
"""'er Yet the harder proolc:m, l.'mc:rg.: "h.:n thc: mcentJ\c:~ of expert' arc ~o a') mmetnc 1ha1 
1hcre rs nu vmble compcti rion al a lc\cl of Mall\l1cal detail. Our s1udy 111 the cugcruc cpi<odc 
111 slJIListic' anJ cconomi<.:s (Pcarc & Levy, 200'i) luld' 'cry liule compc11t1\C: oppm1tiun lo thi' 
gha,lly .. ,c1cn11fic" developmenr. 
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One promising approach to deal with the ralional choice of statistical deceit come.s out of 
biomedical reseiu-ch. in which cl inical trials are qui le literally matters of life and death (Berger 
cl al., 2006). The authors suggest that cxpens. who are sympathetic Lo paticnL~ bt:ing victimized 
by the advice llowing from ill-designed clinical statistical procedures, might follow the thought 
experiment of John Rawls. So, medical experts would imagine tht:mselvcs behind a veil of 
ignorance in which their private rational choice considerations are set aside. 
In the context of the re~earch design, the .. veil of ignoranc., .. idea 1>0uld require 1hat re-
searchers agree to constme a~ optimal only those design melhods that all research would 
willingly assent antcccdentially (i.e., before they had looked at a particular sel of data.) 
(Berger ct al.. 2006) 
Our suggestion of stulistical arbitration might he one method that passes the deep test pr<r 
posed hy Ritwls. II' an expert will not pre-commil to a procedure, his clients might wdl have a 
good reason lO ask why not. 
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